marriage settlement as
release of a joint tortfeasor's trespass
son and heir's marriage belongs to father, father has Trespass vi et armis
for taking his son and heir, or Trespass on the Case
450 (CCCC. l.) marks (= 300 pounds); 350 marks (= 233 pounds 6 shillings 8
pence); 100 marks (= 66 pounds 13 shillings 4 pence)
Sjt Fairfax (for P): notwithstanding that such a communication was made that
one (plaintiff knight) would pay 450 (CCCC. l.) marks yet it could be that
they were agreed for a marriage for 350 marks, so when the defendant remitted
100 marks for the marriage, it will not be understood to have been for
anything else, but the final conclusion (of the plea) was that Sir J.Ashton
gave solely 350 marks for marriage, so that the communication with the recouping
of the 100 marks cannot be called any recompence (recompensation) in bar of
the action, and Sir, as to (what is said), that T. (Wortheley, the other
trespasser) would give his son to Sir J. Ashton (his daughter) for the
marriage, so T. Worthely (the other trespasser) had 'Quid pro quo', and I put
(dato) that T. (Wortheley, the other trespasser) had given the marriage to
Sir J. Ashton (his daughter) 'quitement' without taking anything, yet this is
no satisfaction, because the plaintiff does not have any benefit from this,
but the advantage that Alice (A.) the daughter of J.Ashton and to bar the
plaintiff by a satisfaction made to a stranger, would be unreasonable
(encounter reason)
Sjt Pygot (for D): it seems to me the contrary, and as to this (that is said
that) the communication was irrelevant (n' est pas a purpose), this is not
so, because the communication is alleged to prove that the marriage of the
said Nicholas (N.) was worth (vaudra) 450 marks, and so when the sum was
mitigated to 350 marks, and also the marriage gave to the said Nicholas (N.)
to the plaintiff to prove that the plaintiff had a profit by this, that is,
that where he (plaintiff) ought to have paid 450 marks, thus now he ought to
pay only 350 marks, so that 100 marks are in the plaintiff's advantage, and
also when it was agreed that he (plaintiff knight's daughter) ought to have
Nicholas his (T. Wortheley, the other trespasser's) son in marriage, and he
had fulfilled (perimplie) this agreement, this was in satisfaction in itself,
because the marriage of my son and heir belongs to me, because I will have a
writ of Trespass for taking my son and heir with force and arms', and (I
will) recover damages immediately (maint-) regarding the marriage, so when
the marriage was given to the plaintiff, this was an advantage to him for the
marriage of his daughter, so the plaintiff is satisfied, so
Billyng CJKB said that if Nicholas (N.) be taken out of his (father T.
Wortheley's) wardship, that he (the father) will not have a writ of
Ravishment of ward, but he will have a good writ of Trespass on the case, and
recover his damages,
and then Sjt Pygot (for D) said more for his plea that an accord was made
before the marriage, and also it was agreed that T. Wortheley ought to make a
deed and deliver it to the plaintiff (knight), by which a certain jointure
ought to be made to Nicholas and to Alice his wife, and also he ought to give
to the plaintiff at the time of the marriage, a ton of red wine, and said in
fact that he had delivered the aforesaid deed, and the wine according to the
condition and aforesaid judgment,
and on this the parties demurred in judgment for two causes, one whether this
matter proved a satisfaction or not, (and) another (cause) because this
action was founded by reason (cause) of an act of Parliament made against the
defendant and (against) one W. so that T. Wortheley was a stranger to this
act, whether or not he ought to plead his satisfaction had by him, against
whom no action is given by reason of this statute
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